Privileged access management

In our experience, the first wave enrolls the accounts people remember, and the rest are service accounts with no rotation owner, infrastructure logins shared by a stable team, and secrets in pipelines. Coverage stalls because there is no inventory to work from and no agreed order. The fix starts with the inventory and a sequence by exposure and blast radius.

Trust substitutes for controls until an incident. If a shared account is compromised there is no way to tell which session was the attacker's, what they did, or when it began, and the auditor's question, show me who did what, has no answer. The proportionate fix for a small team is named accounts for daily work and a monitored break-glass account, which is often achievable with the tools you already own.

We are independent of every vendor. The product's solution engineers know its reference architecture and deploy it. Truvo decides what belongs in it, in what order, with what exceptions, and produces the evidence that it works.

Not every system supports every control, and the frameworks do not require that they do. What they require is that access controls are appropriate to the risk. The exception goes in the risk register with compensating controls, such as IP allowlisting and stronger credentials, documented rather than ignored.

SOC 2 CC6.1, CC6.2 and CC6.3 expect logical access restricted to authorized individuals, provisioned and removed on a process, and reviewed. ISO 27001 Annex A covers privileged access rights directly. The engagement produces the inventory, the reviews and the attribution records those controls are tested on.